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This study examines a differential game surveillance-
evasion model in an effort to evaluate an existing model,
bridge the gap between theory and applications of the
theory and to attempt to provide insight into further
extension of theory.
Escape paths generated by the model were plotted for
the case where surveillance could not be maintained. Short-
comings of the model, most notably the lack of provision
for the reacquisition of the Evader after escape, were
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This report documents the results of an examination of
a differential game model of a surveillance-evasion situ-
ation as related to Naval Warfare. Particular attention
was paid to the aspect of adequacy of the model to realis-
tically depict the proper operational situation and to
the applicability of the model to the operational require-
ments currently required to be met by the Naval forces at
sea.
The particular model which was the subject of this
evaluation was one used by J. Taylor [1] . This work was
undertaken in an effort to bridge the gap between pure
theory and application and to provide insight into possible
future extensions of theory.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
The model presented in [1] is summarized here for
convenience of discussion.
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A tracker, or pursuer, attempts to maintain surveillance
over another object, or the evader. The Pursuer has a speed
advantage over the Evader, but the Evader is more manueverable
in that the Pursuer is restricted in his turning radius, or
rate of change of direction, while the Evader is permitted
to change his direction of movement instantaneously. The
Pursuer is considered to have a "cookie cutter" detection
device; that is, surveillance is maintained only as long as
the distance from the Pursuer to the Evader is less than
the detection range of the device.
The objective of the Pursuer is to maintain the Evader
under surveillance as long as possible and conversely the
Evader attempts to escape the Pursuer's detection region as
quickly as possible.
The following notation is repeated from [1]
:
s, = Pursuer's speed with maximum w.
s~ = Evader's speed with maximum w~
R = Pursuer's minimum turning radius
§ = Fraction of maximum course curvature employed
by Pursuer (<J> = -1 corresponds to left turn
with minimum turning radius)

lp = Evader's heading relative to that of Pursuer
d = Pursuer's detection range
T = time for Evader to escape (reach circle of
radius d from Pursuer)
This study was conducted from the point of view of the
Pursuer. Therefore the problem is (from [1])
max min dt
subject to the equations of motion of the Pursuer and the
Evader. In solving this problem it is customary to use.
a
relative coordinate system wherein the Pursuer is always at
the origin with a heading in the positive direction along








dt with T unspecified,
dx s-jyc})
subject to:
-^r- = - —
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+ s^sinij;





and -1 < <j> < + 1,
<_ s < w, /
1 s 9 - w2 — W l'
with initial location of Evader
x(t = 0) = x Q ,
y(t = 0) = yn ,

and terminal surface defined by
x
2 (T) + y
2 (T) = d 2 .
For the derivation of these equations the reader is
referred to Appendix A of [1]
.
It is assummed that the situation of perfect information
exists; that is, each participant knows the actions of the
other instantaneously.
B. OPTIMAL ESCAPE TRAJECTORIES OF THE EVADER
The optimal escape trajectory of the Evader as derived
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cos U = —
,w
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1 u 1 \ '
and t = (T - t) .

U denotes the angle between the heading of the Pursuer
and the point of escape from the detection region by the
Evader.

III. DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL
Escape trajectories for the case where the model indicated
that surveillance could not be maintained were plotted for
angles of escape from the detection region of 60 degrees
through 180 degrees at 10 degree intervals. The solutions to
equations (1) and (2) for value of t greater than zero
established these paths as shown in Figure 1. The values of









A. OPTIMAL ESCAPE PATHS
From Figure 1 it can be seen that escape paths exist for
all points in the state space and the "surveillance pockets"
which Taylor [1] suspected are not present. Also, the paths
for escape at points between 60 degrees and 90 degrees are
smooth and continuous.
It should be noted, however, that although all points
on a given curve satisfy equations (1) and (2), only that
portion of the curve in the first quadrant of the detection
region is optimal.
For the curve BB'B", for example, the value of t in (1)
and (2) which give the point B' is 1.2. However, if at that
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point the Pursuer were to stop (s, = 0) , the Evader would
escape in the shortest length of time by steering a course
directly away from the Pursuer and would escape at point D.
An examination of the distance and speed involved in this
tactic discloses the fact that the time required to escape
from point B 1 to D is 2.5, which indicates that this is
preferred by the Pursuer, who desires to maximize the time
until the Evader escapes. That is to say that although the
entire curve BB'B" describes an escape route, only that
portion from B to B 1 lies on the optimal path. Extending
this results in the conclusion that all optimal escape paths
which intersect the radius OD utilize that portion of OD
from the point of intersection to point D. Those portions
of the curves lying in the fourth quadrant, while constituting
escape paths, are not optimal.
Similarly, those curves which intersect the vertical
radius OE before reaching the horizontal diameter D'D are also
optimal only in the first quadrant. For example, curve CC'C"
describes an escape path, but the time to escape, x, follow-
ing the curve C'C" is 1.4 while that for the line segment
C'OC" is 3.71. At point C the optimal tactic for the Pursuer
is to steer directly toward the Evader (<f> = 0) and stop when
the Evader is at point 0. This will cause the time required
to escape from point C 1 to be as noted above (3.71).
As pointed out by Taylor, for u = U = 60 degrees, the
path does form a cusp. This cusp occurs at time t = 1.4 at
point A' on Figure 1. That part of the curve for values of
11

t greater than 1.4 is not optimal, for an Evader on that
portion of the curve could escape more quickly by following
a path which would lead him to escape the detection region
at some escape angle greater than 60 degrees. That part of
the curve for u = 60 degrees for values of t less than 1.4
(arc AA 1 ) is indeed the barrier, for those segments of the
escape paths (for escape angles greater than 60 degrees) to
the right of the barrier are likewise not optimal in that an
Evader could escape the detection region sooner by following
a path roughly parallel to A' A.
This termination of the barrier at point A' is the
criteria which indicates that no surveillance zone exists.
If such a zone did in fact exist, the barrier would be the
boundary of a closed set of points which would not lie on any
escape path. As can be seen from the mapping of paths on
Figure 1, such a set of points does not exist.
B. ADEQUACY OF THE MODEL
In examining the requirement of the model that the
Pursuer stop (s, = 0) at the time that the Evader reaches a
point 90 degrees or 270 degrees relative to the Pursuer's
heading, it was discovered that a clarification of equation
(D8) of Appendix D of [1] was required. The equation is
repeated here.




for -~ < u < ^-77
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It would appear that this equation states that if the escape
angle will be greater than 90 degrees the Pursuer should stop.
This is incorrect as the value of s, is not a function of u,
the escape angle, but rather is a function of time and the
position of the Evader on the escape path. Since t = (T -t)
,
s, is further a function of t. The equation and conditions
for its equality are correctly stated as





The values of the parameters used were considered appro-
priate for a destroyer-submarine surveillance situation,
considering conventional submarines and the sonar equipment
most commonly in use in the present-day fleet. For the newer
sonar equipments the ratio of sonar range to minimum turning
radius of the destroyer would be low, however, but it is felt
that this does not significantly detract from the result of
this study.
One aspect of the operational situation which is not
covered by the model examined is the reacquisition of the
Evader after it has escaped from the detection region of the
Pursuer. This is an important aspect, for surveillance of
potentially hostile submarine contacts calls for extended
periods of surveillance, and while this model maximizes the
time which is required for the Evader to escape the detection
region, it is a "single pass" model.
13

C. REACQUIRING EVADER AFTER ESCAPE
A model which would be more applicable to a continuous
surveillance-evasion situation would be one which would take
under consideration the fact that, since no surveillance
zone exists, the Evader will eventually escape the detection
region and must be reacquired for long-term surveillance to
be possible.
Such a model should have as its objective the minimization
of reacquisition time; that is, it should minimize the time
during which the Evader is not in the detection region of the
Pursuer.
The tactics utilized by the Pursuer to place the Evader
back in his detection region after escape has occurred would
depend on several factors, but primarily they would depend
on the position of the Evader at the time of escape and the
assumptions concerning perfect or imperfect information.
Concerning the latter, the assumption of imperfect infor-
mation once escape has occurred would be valid from the
viewpoint of the Pursuer, since the Evader is no longer within
the detection region of the Pursuer, but would be less valid
from the point of view of the Evader if one is considering a
destroyer-submarine situation. This is true because of the
much longer range capability of the passive detection devices
in use aboard submarine type vessels as compared to the




Conversely, the assumption of perfect information once
escape has occurred is invalid from the point of view of the
Pursuer (the Evader is no longer in the detection region of
the Pursuer) but is more valid when considering the Evader,
for the same reason mentioned above.
Therefore, the more realistic approach would be to assume
perfect information to the Evader on the movements of the
Pursuer, but imperfect information to the Pursuer on the
movement of the Evader.
A further assumption of instantaneous acceleration and
deceleration for both Pursuer and Evader, while not completely
realistic, is in order and it is felt that this would have
little or no effect on the accuracy of the models.
It has been noted that, given optimal manuevering by both
Pursuer and Evader, escape will occur at a point on the
boundary of the detection region at an escape angle u, such
that (for the particular parameters used in this study)
90°
_> u >_ 60°
for those escape paths which do not intersect the vertical
axis of the detection region (radius OE in Figure 1) and at
u = 180 degrees for those paths which do intersect the vertical
axis •
Consider the possible actions for the Pursuer at the time
of escape in the first case. One such action would be to
continue in a turn (<J> = +1) at maximum speed (s, = w-. ) , in
which case the Pursuer's trajectory would be as described by
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the arc AA ' in Figure 2 . Denote the time required for the
Pursuer to travel the arclength from A to A 1 by t. At the
instant the Pursuer arrives at point A 1 , the Evader must be
within a circle of radius Z centered at point B, point B
representing the point at which the Evader escaped from the
detection region, where Z = w2t. The probability that the
Pursuer is again maintaining surveillance of the Evader when
at point A 1 is represented by the ratio of the area of the
intersection of the circles centered on A 1 and B to the area
of the circle of radius Z centered on point B. If the Evader
is within the detection region at this time, the escape paths
of Figure 1 can be used to again effect an escape.
A second possible course of action would be to manuever
as indicated in Figure 3. In this case, the initial action
at the time of escape would be a turn to the left (<j) = -1) at
point A, with a subsequent turn to the right at point A 1
(<f> = +1) to traverse an arc A'B which would place the Pursuer
at point B, the last known position of the Evader, at time t.
Again, due to the speed restriction on the Evader, the Evader
will be within a circle of radius Z centered at point B,
where again Z = w~t. The probability that the Evader is under
surveillance at time t is again represented by the ratio of
the area of possibility of the Evader which is enclosed in the




For the case of escape from the detection region at 180
degrees, it is proposed that a turn to the right at the time
of escape (cj) = +1) at maximum speed (s, = w, ) be made by the
Pursuer at point A in Figure 4. This turn would be maintained
until the Pursuer arrived at point A' , which is the point of
tangency with the turning circle of a tangent through the
last known position of the Evader, point B. As can be deter-
mined by examination of the radius of possibility of the
Evader, the probability that the Evader is within the detection
region when the Pursuer arrives at point B is quite low.
It should be noted that the optimal values of x as seen on
Figure 1 indicate that the surveillance time on each pass of
the "single pass" model examined is greater for those points
on the detection circle near the heading of the Pursuer than
for points at larger angles from the Pursuer's heading. There-
fore, it would appear that it would be advantageous to attempt
to manuever the Pursuer to enable him to reacquire the Evader
at a point as near as possible to the Pursuer's heading.
This would appear to be possible as the assumption of perfect
information on the part of the Evader would permit one to
predict the Evader's movements during the time he is out of




As a model to describe a surveillance-evasion situation,
the differential game model examined proved to realistically
describe a situation which would confront a destroyer
attempting to maintain surveillance over a potentially
hostile submarine contact. However, the model fails to pro-
vide for a long term surveillance situation which is currently
required to be met by the operating forces at sea.
In the case whereby the Evader can escape the detection
region, the current model must be modified to provide for
reacquisition after the escape or it must be used in con-
junction with some existing pursuit-evasion model. The
suggestions provided in this paper hopefully will provide
insight into the problems surrounding reacquisition and a
basis for further research effort in this vital area.
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This study examines a differential game surveillance-evasion
model in an effort to evaluate an existing model, bridge the gap
between theory and applications of the theory and to attempt to
provide insight into further extension of theory.
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